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13 June 1955

ADVISORY TO DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE ON PROPOSED DCID 3/6, 16 MAY 1955:

ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHIEF MISSILE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (CMIC)

1. Negative Reaction of Military Services Anticipated.

a. Military members of Scientific Estimates Committee stated informally on 9 June that their SAC members were being briefed to oppose formation of CMIC for the following reasons:

- (1) Existing coordinating mechanisms are sufficient. These are:
  - a. Scientific Estimates Committee - for coordination of opinion National Estimates.
  - b. Joint Technical Intelligence Committee (and its GS Working Group) - for coordination of "hardware" aspects.
  - c. (Not mentioned, but included in coordinating groups in GS Field are Economics Intelligence Committee and its GS Working Group; and the Intelligence Priorities Committee for coordination of covert activities.)

(2) Functions of CMIC, not now included in charters of above groups, can be added and handled satisfactorily.

(3) Adverse to starting "another Committee".

(4) Military feel capable of handling guided missiles, together with all other military hardware items, as currently assigned in DCID 3/4.

b. Positions of State, ADIC, and FBI are unknown.

2. Reduced Basis for Opposition.

a. Enforcement of CMIC is admission that military is unable to do the job in this field.

b. Authorities and prerogatives have been established in current committees and individuals are resisting infringement on "experts."

c. Military intelligence has actually not accepted fact that threat of hostile guided missiles is as critical as national policy says it is.

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3. Recommended Counter Points

a. Potential of guided missiles is great and recognized by developmental and operational sides of military. Witness US effort in size of program and priorities being applied. Necessity of centralized control recognized in 1950 with appointment of [REDACTED]. Re-establishment of similar control now being discussed in the office of the Secretary of Defense.

b. Threat of hostile guided missiles equally great and real, and is of critical concern to all IAC activities. No countermeasures have been worked out. IAC has responsibility to centralize and focalize intelligence efforts in this field.

c. Accepted that functions of COMIC can be divided and allocated to existing groups, but this will result in split responsibilities, duplication of effort, and most dangerous, possible unintentional non-coverage of critical areas.

d. None of current coordinating groups have broad enough coverage, including membership, that they could be handed the whole "ball of wax."

e. To achieve fullest efficiency and surveillance in this critical field, IAC needs one coordinating group, rather than any augmentation of present division of responsibilities and interests.

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[REDACTED]  
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